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1. Introduction 
Policymakers have performed a significant number of interventions, both in terms of instruments 
used and number of actions run, to repair the negative effects of financial turmoil (Girardone et 
al., 2013; Matousek et al., 2013). Most G-20 countries have announced fiscal stimulus measures 
(Molyneux et al., 2013). According to Prasad et al. (2009), in 2009, the total amount of stimulus 
in the G-20 was $700 billion (i.e., 1.4% of their combined GDP and 1.1% of world GDP); more 
than half of the overall stimulus in 2009 was carried out by only three countries: the U.S., China 
and Japan. In 2010, three of the world’s largest economies (the U.S., China and Germany) had 
planned stimulus packages raising an amount between 2% and 3% of their 2008 GDP; France 
had proposed stimulus packages amounting to only 0.7% of GDP in 2009. Similarly, monetary 
policy authorities worldwide developed and launched new “unconventional” forms of monetary 
support (Alfonso et al., 2011). Most banking systems received exceptional levels of support: for 
example, the total recapitalization and asset relief in European banking from 2008 to 2012 
equalled nearly 1 trillion Euro (i.e., Germany 144 billion Euro, the U.K. 123 billion Euro, Spain 
88 billion Euro, Ireland 65 billion Euro, Belgium 40 billion Euro, Greece 37 billion Euro, France 
26 billion Euro, the Netherlands 24 billion Euro, and Italy 6 billion Euro).  
Not surprisingly, an increasing number of papers have been investigating the 
effectiveness of policy responses to the financial crisis. Most of these papers run empirical 
analyses with a narrow scope, e.g., focusing on a single policy action and/or a specific market. 
For example, McAndrews et al. (2008) examine the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s Term 
Auction Facility (TAF) in mitigating liquidity problems in the interbank funding market. Baba 
and Packer (2009) analyse the effect of the swap lines among central banks in reducing the dollar 
shortage problem. Meaning and Zhu (2011) explore the impact of recent purchases of Treasury 
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securities by the Federal Reserve and the impact of gilts by the Bank of England on government 
bond yields. Pennathur et al. (2014) examine market reaction to nine U.S. government 
interventions in response to the crisis in various types of financial institutions (banks, savings 
and loan associations, insurance companies, and real estate investment trusts) and show that 
these measures generally result in an increase in risk and a reduction in value. Ricci (2015) 
analyses the impact of the ECB monetary policy announcements between June 2007 and June 
2013 on the stock price of European banks: the paper shows that European banks were more 
sensitive to non-conventional measures than to interest rate decisions and that the same type of 
intervention may have a different impact depending on the stage of the crisis. 
Only a handful of empirical papers take a broad scope and seek to assess the reaction to a 
large set of policy interventions in a large set of financial markets. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) 
examine the effect of a large range of policy announcements (fiscal and monetary policy, 
liquidity support, financial sector policy, and ad hoc bank failures) on the interbank credit and 
liquidity risk premia in the U.S., the Euro area, the U.K., and Japan between June 2007 and 
March 2009. The paper shows that policy announcements were usually associated with 
reductions in the LIBOR–OIS spreads; however, no one-policy action was better than another in 
containing the crisis. Recently, Fiordelisi and Ricci (2015) use a detailed dataset of worldwide 
policy interventions between June 2007 and June 2012 to analyse their effect on stock prices and 
CDS returns of Global Systematically Important Banks (G-SIBs). The authors show that 
different policy interventions from governments and central banks have produced diverse market 
reactions, e.g., stock market participants have generally appreciated monetary policy 
interventions, whichever direction (restrictive or expansionary) they have taken, in all currency 
areas. By contrast, failures and bail-outs have generated a strong negative reaction everywhere.  
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Bredin et al. (2009) investigate the stock market response to international monetary 
policy changes in the UK and Germany by looking at the impact of (un)expected interest rate 
changes on stock returns at the industry level. The paper shows that monetary policy surprises 
have a significant and negative influence in both countries on stock returns on both industry- and 
whole market levels. Recently, Haitsma et al. (2016) run an event study to estimate the European 
stock market’s reaction to the European Central Bank’s policies during 1999-2015. 
Unconventional monetary policy surprises affect the EURO STOXX 50 index; value and past 
loser stocks also show a larger reaction to monetary policy surprises. By using the Rigobon 
(2003) heteroskedasticity-based approach, Kholodilin et al. (2009) also analyse the response of 
European stock markets to the ECB monetary policy shocks. Monetary policy tightening is found 
to have a heterogeneous impact on Euro area sectors on the policy announcement day. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of these papers investigated stock reactions to policy 
announcements by distinguishing them across industries (e.g., banks vs non-banks) or countries 
(Europe, Asia and the US). Moreover, the previous papers mainly focused on a single company’s 
stock return (generally, banks or financial companies), some market rates or spread (e.g., 
liquidity or credit-risk premia). This is surprising since the effect of policy interventions on non-
financial companies has not been explicitly investigated given the assumption that policy 
changes during the crisis were only designed to help banks. This leads us to the following 
questions: Did policy interventions produce positive effects for all (not only financial) listed 
companies? Did the same policy intervention produce different effects on financial and non-
financial companies? Did some policy actions work better than others? To answer these 
questions, we ran an event study estimating abnormal stock reactions (around the announcement 
date of a wide range of policy actions between 1 June 2007 and 30 June 2012) by focusing on 
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stock indices representing the entire market1. We have four main results. First, stock industry 
indices react to policy interventions differently than the broad stock index (capturing the whole 
national stock market), which suggests the existence of portfolio diversification opportunities. 
Second, stock returns react negatively to restriction measures for general and non-banking sector 
indices. Third, stock reaction to expansionary measures is stronger during the first (and hardest) 
stage of the financial crisis (1 June 2007 – 14 September 2008). In final, when we consider the 
results connected to bank failure events, we observe negative stock returns for each index in our 
sample.  
The contribution of our paper to the previous literature is manifold. First and foremost, 
our paper provides new insights on the effect that policy interventions have on non-banking 
companies from the 2007 financial crisis onwards. Although some previous papers analysed 
specific stock price effects of monetary policy actions at the industry level (e.g., Bernanke and 
Kuttner, 2005), no papers have assessed the effect of monetary policy during the financial crisis 
period at the industry level and worldwide. This is surprising since policymakers have performed 
a significant number of interventions (both in terms of instruments used and number of actions 
run) to repair the negative effects of the financial turmoil. Second, few papers (see, for example, 
Cassola et al. 2004, Afonso et al., 2011; Agnello et al., 2013; Jansen et al., 2008) have 
investigated the effects of fiscal policy on stock markets; our paper provides new insights by 
focusing on policy interventions over the complete financial crisis period. Specifically, our 
dataset enables us to consider the US subprime crisis (from 1 June 2007 to 14 September 2008), 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC, from 15 September 2008 to 1 May 2010) and the sovereign 
                                                          
1 Specifically, we focus on twelve worldwide general indices in the following financial markets: Belgium, China, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. In each country, we selected economic sector data (relative to the SIC10 code) as follows: FTSE Industrials, 
FTSE Technology, FTSE Telecom, FTSE Utilities, FTSE Consumer & Materials, FTSE Consumer Goods, FTSE 
Consumer Services, FTSE Basic Materials, FTSE Health Care, and FTSE Oil & Gas. 
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debt crisis (from 2 May 2011 to 30 June 2012). Third, we argue that monetary policy 
interventions influence not only stock prices of banks but also non-financial companies by 
influencing interest rates. Specifically, we argue that some industries (e.g., where high 
investment in tangible capital is necessary) may be more affected by policy interventions than 
others, so there may be differences in the response across industries. 
The main research hypothesis investigated in our paper concerns the effect produced by 
every policy intervention considered during the financial crisis. Specifically, we posit that every 
intervention made during the crisis created value for investors (i.e., once policymakers announce 
an intervention, AR for stock prices increase), but we expect that there will be some differences 
across industries. The underlying idea is that the announcement of a “successful” policy 
intervention has the following impacts: a) a general impact on the economy of a country captured 
by the country’s stock index reaction; and b) a specific impact on the stock returns of a specific 
industry, due to the specific characteristics of the industry itself that make its stock reaction 
different from the market reaction. As such, a policy intervention increases the net expected 
present value of a single industry stock return more than the mean of companies included in the 
market portfolio, so that it generates positive ARs. A policy intervention can increase the net 
expected present value of industry stocks for several reasons. First, the intervention might 
directly or indirectly reduce interest rates (and therefore the cash flows discount rate), which 
would more greatly influence those industries where investment duration is longer. Second, the 
intervention may reduce the probability of default of companies in the sector or risk premia 
demanded by investors; this would benefit sectors closely related to financial companies, which 
are the main receivers of policy interventions. Third, the intervention may also improve the value 
of future cash flows produced by the company in a given industry more than in another industry. 
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We are not interested in investigating the reasons behind a stock’s abnormal return; rather, we are 
interested in identifying which policy interventions have a positive impact on industry “specific” 
stock reactions. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. We present our data and 
variables in Section 2, our empirical design in Section 3 and our main results in Section 4. In 
Section 5, we summarize our findings and discuss their policy implications. 
 
2. Data and Variables 
In this section, we present how we build the variable to measure the impact of policy 
interventions on non-financial companies. Our dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR), calculated in the following five event-windows: 1) a 1-day window (0;0), i.e., the 
day of the announcement; 2) a 2-day windows (0; +1), i.e., from the day of the announcement to 
day +1 around the policy announcement; 3) a 2-day window (-1; 0), i.e., from one day prior to 
the announcement day and the announcement day itself (in this case, we try to capture an 
anticipatory effect of the announcement itself); 4) a 3-day window (1-, +1), i.e., between one day 
prior to and following the announcement day; and 5) a 5-day window (-1;+3), i.e., from one day 
prior to the announcement day and three days following the announcement.  
First, we estimate CARs focusing on a stock index capturing the entire stock exchange 
(hereafter, referred to as the “market index”). As such, we selected the MSCI national stock 
indices2 for the following ten worldwide primary countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 
                                                          
2 General Indexes considered are the following: MSCI Belgium - PRICE INDEX, MSCI France - PRICE INDEX, 
MSCI Germany - PRICE INDEX, MSCI Italy - PRICE INDEX, MSCI Japan - PRICE INDEX, MSCI Netherlands - 
PRICE INDEX, MSCI Spain - PRICE INDEX, MSCI Switzerland - PRICE INDEX, MSCI United Kingdom - 
PRICE INDEX, and MSCI United States - PRICE INDEX. 
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countries are representative of the following five currency areas: Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, 
British Pound, US Dollar, and Euro. For joint announcements by two or more different central 
banks, we measure the reaction in every country involved in the intervention. 
In the second step, we focus on industry indices in each country. Specifically, we selected 
the following economic sectors (relative to the SIC10 code): Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Banks, IT, Telecom and 
Communication Services and Utilities. Similarly to the market indices, we use the FTSE indices 
to measure the stock returns in these industries for each country (hereafter referred to as the 
“industry index”). As such, our variable SECTORj,t refers to the excess return on sector j at 
calendar day t for the following FTSE Stock Market sector indices. Due to space limitations, we 
discuss our results aggregating all non-banking industries in a single model that we label as 
“non-banking”3. 
As shown below in Eq. 1, our independent variables are a set of dummy variables 
indicating policy interventions and financial crisis stages. Specifically, we classify policy 
interventions in six macro categories: 1) monetary policy expansionary (MPE) measures; 2) 
monetary policy restrictions and unchanged (MPRU) measures; 3) Financial Sector Support (FSS) 
actions; 4) State Aid and Fiscal Policy (SAFP); 5) inactions measures (INA) related to bank 
failures and bailout events; and 6) Other (includes mainly administrative measures, e.g., 
restrictions on short selling).  
Next, we collect data for various actions within each macro category. Specifically, we 
identify the following three micro actions in the first macro category (expansionary monetary 
                                                          
3 All non-banking industries (Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health 
Care, IT, Telecom and Communication Services and Utilities) are pooled in the same model by adding a dummy for 
each sector. Our results for each single non-banking industry are reported in the Appendix, which can be obtained 
upon request from the authors or downloaded from the authors’ website. 
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measures): interest rate cuts (IRC); liquidity support (LIQ), which includes the provision of 
liquidity both in domestic currency (i.e., more frequent auctions, longer maturities for 
refinancing operations or extensions of accepted collateral) and foreign currencies (through swap 
agreements between central banks or central banks’ facilities for liquidity in a foreign currency); 
and monetary easing decisions (ME). In the second macro category of policy actions (restrictions 
and unchanged monetary measures), we distinguish two interventions: 1) decisions to stop a 
monetary easing program (CONTR), e.g., the Bank of England stopping some part of the asset 
purchase program on 15 November 2010 after determining that it was no longer necessary given 
the improvements in financial market functioning, and restricted liquidity; and 2) decisions to 
increase the interest rate or to not change the target rates (IRC vs. IRIU). The Financial Sector 
Support (FSS) macro category includes the following interventions: 1) Financial support on 
liability (FL), which are recovery measures for banks in the form of guarantees for old or new 
liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection schemes, and provision of lender of last resort 
facilities; 2) Financial Support on Equity (FR), which includes capital injections and 
nationalization (acquisition of controlling share); and lastly, 3) Financial support on assets (FA), 
which includes recovery measures for banks in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad 
assets and asset guarantees. The macro category of policy actions related to bank failures and 
bailout events includes 1) bank bailouts and assisted mergers (INAB); and 2) bank failures 
(INAF). The remaining two macro categories, i.e., State Aid and Fiscal Policy (SAFP) and Other 
(OTHER), are not split into any micro categories. 
Consistent with Ricci (2015), we address the problem of overlapping events (i.e., press 
releases by the same institution and occurring on the same day) by adopting the following 
criteria: 1) if different announcements belong to the same event-type category, we treat them as a 
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single event; 2) if there is a decision to change the target interest rate, we consider it as the main 
event, and thus, we drop the other events from the event study analysis; 3) if there is a decision 
to leave the current situation unchanged or to continue with a measure previously defined, we 
consider it less important than other announcements in the same press release; and 4) if the 
aforementioned criteria are not sufficient to extrapolate a single event from a package of 
interventions, we identify the main event on the basis of its prominence in the financial press, as 
in Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012). We also checked for an overlapping effect of macro release by 
dropping all events, including in the same day macro news. At the end of the selection process, 
our final sample (excluding announcements overlapping with other relevant events4) includes 
610 events. We report some descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Data are collected from various sources, including Bloomberg and Datastream. For the 
period from June 2007 to March 2009, we draw information from the database compiled by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2010, 2012). For the period from 
April 2009 to the end of June 2012, we collect data from official announcements (in the form of 
press releases) of the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the 
Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank. Specifically, we distinguish between 
announcements from a single central bank5 and coordinated measures as announced in a single 
                                                          
4 Once we excluded overlapping announcements, some cases of events (36 out of 610) remain that are separated 
from each other by less than 3 days. These may be considered overlapping for the longest window of our event study. 
However, we decided to keep them in the sample to avoid discretional selection. 
5 Among single announcements, we have a few cases in which central banks do not release a joint communication 
but independently adopt similar decisions on the same day. In our sample, there are only 4 cases, all regarding 
interest rate cuts: 8 October 2008 (CH, EUR, UK, US); 6 November 2008 (CH, EUR, UK); 4 December 2008 (EUR 
and UK); and 5 March 2009 (EUR and UK). 
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joint press release (e.g., the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the 
Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank adopted joint measures on 13 October 2008 to 
improve liquidity in the short-term U.S. dollar funding market). 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical design is based on three steps. First, we run an event study to estimate the CAR 
for each policy intervention looking both at the market and the industrial indices in each country. 
Second, we focus on the whole stock market by estimating the link between the market index 
CARs and the dummy capturing a specific policy action. Specifically, we run the following 
model to investigate policy intervention effects on the market index: 
𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑀 +  𝜃𝑊𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘,𝑖 + δ𝑑 + δ𝑠 + δ𝑗×𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑘    (1) 
 
where R is the CAR for the market index in the selected event windows for the i-th country. As 
such, we run five regression models, namely MOD Car0 for the (0;0) window, MOD Car13 for 
the (-1;+3) window, MOD Car11 for the (1-,+1) window, MOD Car01for the (0-,+1) windows, 
and MOD Car10 for the (-1-, 0) window.6. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑀  is a vector of dummy variable macro categories 
of policy interventions (i.e., expansionary measures or restrictions and unchanged measures), W 
is a dummy variable indicating if there was a policy intervention in another currency area, and 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘,𝑖 is a set of dummy variables indicating different stages of the financial crisis. The 
inclusion of fixed effects of the day of the week (δd) ensures that each indicator is estimated 
using only within-day of the week variation in the dependent variable, sector fixed effects (δs) 
control for the industry heterogeneity, time*country dummies (δt×j) control for state × time level 
                                                          
6 A detailed explanation of the event window estimation procedure is reported in the Appendix, which can be 
obtained from the authors upon request or downloaded from the authors’ website. 
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trends. 
Next, we focus on industry indices by distinguishing between banks and non-banking 
companies. Our empirical approach is similar to the one used for the market indices (model 1): 
specifically, we run equation 1 replacing the dependent variable by the CARs of the banking 
industry sector indices (first) and the non-banking industry sector indices. In this case, we focus 
report and discuss results for the event window (0,0)7. All variables are described in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
In the third step of our analysis, we run a set of “impact models” in which, one by one, 
each dummy capturing a macro category of policy interventions is replaced by a set of dummies 
indicating the micro actions of interventions. For example, the expansionary monetary policy 
dummy is replaced by the following variables: interest rate cuts dummy, monetary easing 
dummy, and provision of liquidity. To consider the possibility that several interventions have a 
different effect depending on the moment in which they are released, we also add the interactions 
between dummies identifying the micro type of interventions and dummies indicating several 
stages of the financial crisis. After splitting macro category of interventions into corresponding 
micro categories of interventions, we refer to this new set of specifications as an “Impact Model” 
in the Tables at the end of the paper showing the main results.  
 
4. Results 
                                                          
7 We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the 
consistency of our results: the results are available upon request from the authors. 
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We present our results in two steps. First, we illustrate the reaction of market indices (section 4.1) 
and industry indices (section 4.2) to different macro types of policy actions (specifically, 
expansionary monetary policy, restrictive monetary policy and unchanged measures, state aid 
and fiscal policies, bank failures/bailouts interventions, and financial sector policies). In section 
4.3, we present our results of the impact study models by distinguishing various policy actions 
within each macro class of interventions (e.g., we split the macro class “Expansionary Monetary 
Policy interventions” into 1) interest rate cut, 2) liquidity supporting, and 3) monetary easing). 
 
4.1 Macro category of policy interventions: the effect on market indices 
In this section, we discuss our results on the reaction of market indices to policy interventions by 
considering the macro category of interventions (Table 3). We find that stock market reactions 
display a different relationship with various macro categories of policy actions. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 3 > 
 
We show that the estimated coefficients for Monetary Policy Expansionary measures 
(MPE) are positive and statistically significant on the announcement day (model 1 in Table 3), 
while the estimated coefficients related to CARs in other event windows are not found to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level or less. This suggests that MPE actions produce a 
positive influence on market indices over a very short time horizon, but we do not find 
statistically significant evidence of this effect over longer time periods. Regarding Monetary 
Policy Restriction or Unchanged (MPRU) measures, we observe negative and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates (in models 3 and 4 of Table 3), suggesting that MPRU measures 
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produce a negative influence on market indices the next day after the announcements but not on 
the same day.  
Financial Sector Support (FSS) measures (i.e., all instruments used to resolve systemic 
banking crises) negatively influence market indices reactions in all models in Table 3 (expect 
model 2): as for the previous macro category of interventions, the effect seems to be limited to a 
very short time period (i.e., the announcement day and the following day). Interestingly, 
investors are able to anticipate the effect of financial sector support actions, as suggested by the 
negative estimated coefficient in model 5 of Table 3. Inaction measures (INA), related to bank 
failures and bailout events, display a negative relationship with market indices in two event 
windows (models 1 and 5), i.e., the announcement day and the day before. We show that 
investors not only react negatively to INA measures on the announcement day, but they also 
anticipate these measures, as suggested by the negative estimated coefficient in model 5 of Table 
3. The estimated coefficient for the dummy capturing the residual category of policy 
interventions (OTHER) is negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level or lower) in 
models 1 and 4 of Table 3; this suggests that investors react to these interventions on the 
announcement day or the following day. State Aid and Fiscal policy (SAFP) measures and the 
end of any interventions (END) do not display any statistical link with abnormal returns of 
market indices. Interestingly, we note that the relationship between global policy interventions 
(W) and market indices reaction is statistically significant at the 5% level or lower in all models 
(expect model 4).  
The result for the dummy capturing the second and third stages of the Global Financial 
Crisis (D2 and D3) are found to be positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or less, 
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suggesting that market indices’ reactions to policy interventions were greater during the second 
(15 Sept 2008 – 1 May 2010) and the third (2 May 2010 – 30 June 2012) stages of the crisis.  
 
4.2 Macro category of policy interventions: the effect on banking and non-financial indices 
In this section, we present our results on the reaction of industry indices to policy interventions 
by considering the macro category of interventions: specifically, we use stock indices for the 
banking industry (first) and non-banking industry (then) as dependent variables. 
Focusing on banking indices, our results (Table 4) are strongly consistent with previous 
findings for the market indices (reported in Table 3). Coefficient estimates of expansionary 
monetary measures in all models in Table 4 (except model 5) are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or less, suggesting that, on average, banking indices have a positive 
reaction to expansionary monetary measures. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 4 > 
 
The estimated coefficients for Monetary Policy Restriction measures (MPR) and financial 
sector policy measures (FSS) are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or less in 
models 2, 3 and 4. The coefficient estimates for Restrictions and Unchanged measures (MPRU) 
exhibit a positive link when stock reaction is measured over three short event windows (i.e., [-
1,3], [-1,1] and [0,1]). Looking at the magnitude of the coefficient estimates, the relationships 
between MPRU and CARs is stronger for banking indices than for market indices. This can 
perhaps be due to the fact that the increasing of interest rates implies higher interest margins for 
banks, and thereby, this produces positive CARs for the banking industry. The coefficient 
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estimates for other interventions (OTHER) and the State Aid and Fiscal Policy (SAFP) are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level in all event windows. Coefficient estimates for world 
level interventions (W) show a negative relationship that is statistically significant at the 5% level 
between CAR when stock market reaction is measured in the event windows (-1;3) and (0;1). 
We are also interested in comparing the response of the general market and banking 
sector in order to highlight some substantial differences. Although expansionary monetary 
measures produce a positive reaction both for market and banking indices, we show that banking 
indices are also influenced by financial sector policy interventions. Second, restrictive monetary 
measures are found to exhibit a positive link with stock indices in banking but a negative link in 
the case of market indices. This result is consistent with Ricci (2015) and the European Central 
Bank (2010, page 62) consideration on monetary policy effectiveness and credit channel 
transmission, which stresses that “the standard monetary policy measures, i.e., changes in the 
key interest rates, could prove insufficient in ensuring the effective transmission of monetary 
stance to banks and, subsequently, the real economy”. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 5 > 
 
In Table 5, we report our results related to the stock reaction of non-banking indices to 
policy interventions. Consistently with Bernanke et al. (2005), Ehrmann et al. (2004), and 
Basistha et al. (2008), we find considerable industry heterogeneity in the responses to policy 
interventions8: specifically, there is a predominance of negative signs for coefficient estimates of 
policy interventions in most of the sector investigated. The estimated coefficients for Monetary 
                                                          
8 Our results for each single non-banking industry are reported in the Appendix, which can be obtained upon request 
from the authors or downloaded from the authors’ website. 
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Policy Expansion Measures are negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level or less) in 
all event windows considered (except the longest one, i.e., [1,3]). Monetary Policy restriction 
measures show a negative link with CARs in all cases, except the window of the day before the 
announcement. The coefficient estimates for the global financial crisis period dummy (D2) are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models, while we show a positive 
reaction for the dummy (D3), corresponding to the sovereign debt crisis period in models 4 and 5. 
Overall, our results show heterogeneity of the response to monetary shocks across all 
sectors of the economy. To sum up, our results (reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5) show that different 
types of interventions are associated with different market reactions. In the case of bank indices, 
the results underscore how banks are interested in any measure that regulators adopt in critical 
situations, since these interventions are viewed as safeguards for the general economy. In 
contrast, in the case of market indices (and also non-banking sector indices), stocks tend to react 
with a stock price reduction when restrictive measures are adopted.  
 
4.3 A follow-up: the effect of the micro category of policy interventions 
In this section, we present our results on the reaction of market, banking and non-banking 
industry indices to specific policy interventions obtained by splitting each macro category of 
interventions (analysed in sections 4.1 and 4.2) in specific actions. Consistently with our research 
design, we rearrange equation (1) as follows: 
𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑗 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑗 𝑌𝑖,𝑗
𝑚𝑖 +  𝜃𝑊𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘,𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑘 δ𝑑 + δ𝑗×𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖   (2) 
 
where R is the CAR for the market index in the selected event windows for the i-th country. As 
such, we run five regression models, namely MOD Car0 for the (0;0) window, MOD Car13 for 
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the (-1;+3) window, MOD Car11 for the (1-,+1) window, MOD Car01for the (0-,+1) window, 
and MOD Car10 for the (-1-, 0) window. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑎 is a vector of dummy variable macro categories of 
policy interventions (i.e., expansionary measures or restriction and unchanged measures), where 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗
𝑚𝑖 is a vector of dummy variables, indicating the existence (or not) of several micro categories 
of policy interventions in each area, W is a dummy variable indicating whether there was a 
policy intervention in another currency area, and 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘,𝑖is a set of dummy variables indicating 
different stages of the financial crisis, δd controls for the day of the week, and time*country 
dummies (δt×j) control for state × time level trends. In non-banking industry models, we also 
include industry dummies (δs). 
First, we focus on the macro category “expansionary monetary measures” by identifying 
the following specific actions: interest rate cuts (IRC), liquidity provision (LIQ), and monetary 
easing intervention (ME). As shown in the table 6, coefficient estimates for LIQ and ME are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level or less for market indices, but 
only LIQ is effective in the banking industry. Regarding the IRC, it is usually expected to have a 
positive effect on the stock market (e.g., by reducing the discount rate of future cash flows) in 
non-crisis periods: our results suggest that, in times of crisis, the IRC generates a negative and 
slight statistically significant influence on market indices, while we find a negative relationship 
for non-financial indices and a positive relationship with banking indices. Our results suggest 
that during bad times, investors believe that the IRC is an effective tool for helping the banking 
industry, while they find that IRC interventions are not effective for the non-banking industry 
and, in general, for the entire stock market. 
Looking at the variables obtained by the interaction of each expansionary monetary 
policy action (i.e., IRC, LIQ and ME) and the dummies accounting for the crisis stage (D2 and 
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D3), we find that most of the coefficient estimates are negative. There are only two cases where 
the coefficient is positive: LIQ*D3 for market and non-financial indices. The negative coefficient 
estimates for D2 and D3 suggests a strong reaction during the first stage of GFC (1 June 2007 –
14 September 2008). This is also in line with the results of Basistha et al. (2008). The sign 
change for LIQ*D2 for the bank industry is quite interesting and underscores that Liquidity 
Support measures are effective for the banking system, particularly during the global financial 
crisis period (15 September 2008 – 1 May 2010). It is worth noting, here and in all banking 
sector estimates, the positive coefficient of Country Dummy related to Belgium accounting for 
the Dexia Bailout event9. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 6 > 
 
Second, we focus on the macro category “restriction and unchanged monetary measures” 
by identifying the following specific actions: CONTR indicates the liquidity drain and 
end/reductions of monetary easing programs; IRIU indicates an interest rate increase or 
unchanged. As suggested by Bernanke et al (2005), there are three broad reasons why a fund rate 
increase may lead to a decline in stock prices. First, it may be associated with a decrease in 
expected future dividends, making the cost of borrowing for a firm higher. Second, a rise in the 
future expected real interest rates used to discount those dividends makes the overall discounted 
dividend sum lower. In addition, a rise in interest rates makes the stock market a less attractive 
place for the allocation of savings, also reducing the equity premium, which is the excess return 
that an individual stock or the overall stock market provides over a risk-free. Estimated 
                                                          
9 Results for each single non-banking industry are reported in the Appendix, which can be obtained upon request 
from the authors or downloaded from the authors’ website. 
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coefficients for the IRIU are negative for market indices and non-financial indices (consistent 
with Gregoriou et al., 2009), while they are positive for banking indices. In the case of banks, the 
positive link between stock returns and the IRIU can be explained since increasing interest rates 
imply higher interest margins for banks. It is worth noting here and in the Fiscal Policy action 
model (in the next paragraph), the negative contribution of the Dummy (D2) accounting for the 
Global Financial crisis, to confirm that bad times occurred for the banking sector at that time. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 7 > 
 
Third, we focus on the macro category “fiscal policy actions”, which includes stimulus 
packages as well as financial support to countries. As shown in Table 8, CARs react positively at 
the announcement day in the interaction model for market indices and non-financial indices, 
while the response to stimulus packages is not statistically significant in the banking sector. A 
positive government expenditure shock usually causes a decline in the stock market (e.g., 
Ardagna, 2009). Although various previous papers do not find a statistically significant effect 
from fiscal policy interventions (e.g., Arin et al., 2009, Agnello et al., 2013), here we believe that 
the difference between expected and estimated coefficients in terms of sign is to be associated 
with a very short-term view in trying to capture market reaction. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 8 > 
 
In Table 9, we present the results connected to “bailout and bank failure events”, i.e., 
INAB is related to bank bailouts and assisted mergers, and INAF is related to bank failures. 
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Coefficient estimates display a negative link between both INAF and INAB for stock return for 
both market and non-financial indices. In the case of the banking industry, INAB displays a 
positive link to stock returns, while INAF shows a negative link. Our results are consistent with 
Veronesi and Zingales (2010), who observe that a banking bailout may have three effects on a 
firm value - two negative and one positive - so that the net effect depends on the relative strength 
of each individual effect. The positive side consists of positive investor reaction due to the 
reduction in the probability of bankruptcy connected with a policy action involving the support 
of the banking firm. Negative aspects consist of a negative signal about the true value of a firm's 
assets – suspected of potential bailout – that can lead to a negative investor reaction.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 9 > 
 
Finally, we focus on “Financial Sector Policies”, i.e., instruments used to resolve 
systemic banking crises: specifically, in this group, we have recovery measures for banks in the 
form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and asset guarantees (FA), recovery 
measures for banks in the form of guarantees for old or new liabilities, enhancement of depositor 
protection schemes, the provision of lender of last resort facilities (FL) and capital injections and 
nationalization (FR). Looking at the significance level and sign of regression coefficients in 
Table 10, the response of market indices and non-banking sectors is very similar. First, we 
observe a positive reaction of market and non-financial indices according to recovery measures 
for banks in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and asset guarantees. This 
measure (FA) also seems to be the strongest policy action among the three categories (FA, FL, 
and FR) investigated. Second, we observe a negative reaction, related to the bank recovery 
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measures group. We also observe a negative reaction, stronger than the previous one in terms of 
estimated parameter magnitude, for policies related to capital injections and nationalization. This 
last result reminds us, in some ways, of what happened for UK Asset Resolution Ltd., which 
caused some British banks to be fully nationalized and a tremendous rise in Central Government 
Debt for repayments, interest, fees and taxes. Investors can interpret this policy action as an 
expansionary fiscal policy, serving as a signal of a deterioration of public finances to markets 
(Ardagna, 2009) or a lack of fiscal discipline (Hallett et al., 2008). Fears for future tax increases 
to cover deficit balance may induce the private sector to dramatically decrease its consumption 
level in favour of savings in liquid assets, penalizing stock markets. As for bank indices, our 
results reveal slightly significant reactions in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad 
assets and asset guarantees. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 10 > 
 
 Finally, we run a test to disentangle the anticipated and surprise effects in monetary 
policy actions based on interest rate decisions following the approach proposed by Bernanke and 
Kuttner (200510). Specifically, we use the change in the futures contract’s price relative to the 
day prior to the policy intervention as a proxy of the surprise element of any change in the 
interest rate target. The unexpected (or “surprise”) target rate change is estimated by the change 
in the rate implied by the current-month futures contract, scaled up by a factor related to the 
number of days in the month affected by the change. As such, we estimate the expected 
component of the rate change as the actual change minus the surprise change.  
 
                                                          
10 We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for suggesting us this additional test. 
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< INSERT TABLE 11 > 
 
Once we disentangled the actual change in the anticipated and surprise effects, we regress 
these two variables (as an independent variable) on the CAR in (0;0) around the announcement 
of monetary policy actions based on interest rate decisions (as a dependent variable). 
Consistently with our previous regressions, we measure the CAR focusing on three indices: 
market, banking and non-banking indices. As shown in Table 11, we find negative and 
statistically significant coefficients both for the anticipated and unanticipated effects in the case 
of market and non-banking indices; this suggests that higher anticipated and surprise components 
are related to lower CARs. These results are consistent with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
Interestingly, we do not find statistically significant results (at the 10% level or less) in the case 
of banking indices. 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper provides new evidence of monetary and fiscal policy actions in international markets 
during the recent financial crisis. Policymakers worldwide have opted for intense policy actions 
aimed at stabilizing and revitalizing their local stock markets. Our paper has analysed the impact 
of (both monetary and fiscal) policy action announcements on stock price indices in the most 
important financial markets worldwide (such as the US, Japan, European countries and China).  
First, we assess the reaction of the market index to different types of policy actions, 
primarily Monetary and Fiscal Interventions. Second, we move our focus from the banking onto 
non-banking sectors by observing the reaction of stock indices representing these sectors. In 
these first two steps, we considered various macro classes of policy interventions (e.g., 
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Expansionary measures, Restriction & unchanged measures, State Aid and Fiscal Policies, Bank 
Failures/Bailouts interventions and Financial Sector Policies) and estimate the abnormal reaction 
of market, banking and non-financial indices. Third, we focus on a specific event window (i.e., 
the day of the press release) and we run a set of “impact models” in which, one by one, the 
dummies indicating a macro category of interventions are substituted by a set of dummies 
indicating the relative micro categories of interventions. For example, the “expansionary 
monetary measures” macro category is sub-divided into the following three actions: interest rate 
cuts, liquidity support, and monetary easing decisions. 
Our most remarkable findings are as follows: 1) stock industry indices react to policy 
interventions in a different manner to the broad stock index (capturing the whole national stock 
market) suggesting the existence of portfolio diversification opportunities; 2) stock returns react 
negatively to restriction measures for general and non-banking sector indices; 3) stock reaction 
to expansionary measures is stronger during the first (and hardest) stage of the financial crisis (1 
June 2007 –14 September 2008); and 4) when we consider the results connected to bank failure 
events, we observe negative stock returns for each index in our sample.  
Our results are particularly interesting for policymakers since we provide evidence of the 
effect of a wide set of policy actions (some of them very new and not explored yet, such as 
monetary easing and liquidity support) focusing not only on financial companies but also on the 
whole stock market and non-banking sectors. Our paper also provides important insights to 
investor portfolio managers, since we show that changes in policy interventions have different 
implications in various industries, which is critical for investment and risk management 
decisions (Ioannidis et al., 2008). 
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Table 1: Policy announcements between June 2007 and June 2012 
This table reports the number of policy interventions collected between June 2007 and June 2012 by the macro categories of actions (Panel A) and the micro 
categories of actions (Panel B).  
 
Panel A – Number of policy actions by macro type of intervention 
 
Financial Sector 
Policies 
Policy Inaction and Bank 
Failures/Bailouts 
Monetary 
Policy 
Fiscal Policy & 
State Aid 
Other 
Measures 
End of recovery or austerity 
measures 
Total 
2007 5 1 33 0 14 0 53 
2008 19 7 67 9 36 0 138 
2009 34 5 89 10 44 12 194 
2010 14 5 54 3 27 3 106 
2011 5 1 59 5 10 0 80 
2012 4 1 28 2 4 0 39 
Total 81 20 330 29 135 15 610 
 
Panel B – Number of policy actions by micro type of intervention 
  Financial Sector Policies 
Policy Inaction and 
Bank Failures/Bailouts 
Expansionary 
Monetary Policy 
Restrictive Monetary 
Policy 
Fiscal Policy 
& State Aid 
Other 
Measures 
End of recovery or 
austerity measures 
  FA FL FR INABAIL_FAIL IRC LIQ+ CONTR IRIU ME FISPOL OTHER END_AUS 
2007 0 5 0 1 2 13 0 18 0 0 14 0 
2008 6 6 7 7 11 29 1 25 1 9 36 0 
2009 10 11 13 5 6 44 6 23 10 10 44 12 
2010 2 11 1 5 1 10 8 31 4 3 27 3 
2011 0 3 2 1 4 8 4 28 15 5 10 0 
2012 1 1 2 1 0 5 3 13 7 2 4 0 
Total 19 37 25 20 24 109 22 138 37 29 135 15 
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Table 2: Variable description 
This table describes all variables used in the empirical analysis run in the paper. 
Variables Symbol Description 
Expansionary 
Monetary Policy 
MPE Expansionary measures are classified as interest rates cut (IRC), liquidity provision 
(LIQ), and monetary easing (ME) 
Restrictive and 
Unchanged Monetary 
Policy 
MPR 
Restrictive measures are classified as interest rates increased or unchanged (IRIU), and 
liquidity reduction (CONTR) 
Interest rates cut IRC IRC indicates interest rate cuts 
Liquidity provision LIQ LIQ indicates liquidity provision, in both domestic or foreign currencies 
Monetary easing  ME ME indicates monetary easing interventions 
Interest rates increased 
or unchanged IRIU IRIU indicates interest rates increased or unchanged 
Liquidity reduction CONTR CONTR indicates liquidity drain or end/reduction of monetary easing programs 
Stimulus packages SAFP SAFP is a dummy variable that includes stimulus packages as financial support to 
countries 
Financial Support FSS 
FIN_SUPPORT includes all instruments used to resolve systemic banking crises. We 
distinguish three types of interventions: asset support (FA), liability support (FL) and 
equity support (FR) 
Financial support on 
assets FA 
FA includes recovery measures for banks in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing 
of bad assets and asset guarantees 
Financial support on 
liability 
FL 
FL includes recovery measures for banks in the form of guarantees for old or new 
liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection schemes, and provision of lender of last 
resort facilities  
Financial support on 
equity FR FR includes capital injections and nationalization (acquisition of controlling share). 
Bail-outs and failures INA INA includes decisions allowing single banks to fail or bail-out. We distinguish two 
cases: bank bail-outs and assisted mergers (INAB) and the bank failure (INAF) 
Bail-outs and assisted 
mergers 
INAB INAB indicates bank bail-outs and assisted mergers 
Bank failures INAF INAF indicates bank failures 
End of all 
interventions 
END END indicates the end of all interventions 
World level 
intervention 
W W is a control dummy variables equal to one if the stocks are subject to a world level 
intervention and zero otherwise. 
Other measures OTHER 
OTHER is a residual category including stimulus and austerity packages, 
administrative measures, restrictions on short selling and other announcements that do 
not belong to previous categories but are believed to generate a significant market 
reaction 
Abnormal Return AR 
AR in a given trading day (t) is the difference between the actual stock return of a bank 
at time t and its expected return (i.e., the one expected in the absence of relevant 
events) at time t 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
CAR CAR is the cumulated AR over a time period (event window) around the 
announcement date.  
Dummy Stage 2 D2 D2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the policy action is in the global 
financial crisis period (15 September 2008 – 1 May 2010) and zero otherwise 
Dummy Stage 3 D3 
D3 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the policy action is in the 
sovereign debt crisis period (2 May 2010 – 30 June 2012) and zero otherwise 
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Table 3: The market indices’ reaction to policy intervention announcements: general model  
This table reports empirical results by running equation 1. The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (estimated focusing on the Stock Market Index 
proxied by FTSE broad indices) around policy announcements from between June 2007 and June 2012. In column (1), the dependent variable is the CAR calculated 
over the one-day (0;0) event window. In column (2), y is the CAR over the 5-day (-1; +3) event window. In column (3), y is the CAR over the 3-day (-1;+1) event 
window. In column (4), y is the CAR calculated over the two-day (0; +1) event window. In column (5), y is the CAR calculated over the two-day (-1; 0) event 
window. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
MPE 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 
MPRU 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0013*** 0.0005 -0.0009** 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 
FSS -0.0012*** 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.0015*** 0.0004 -0.0008** 0.0004 
INA -0.0023*** 0.0005 0.002* 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0008 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0035*** 0.0007 
OTHER -0.0006** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004 
SAFP 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 
END 0.0007 0.0008 0.004*** 0.0015 0.0001 0.0013 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0010 
W -0.0006* 0.0004 -0.0029*** 0.0007 -0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0014*** 0.0005 
D2 0.0008** 0.0003 0.0019*** 0.0007 0.0018*** 0.0005 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.001** 0.0004 
D3 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0019*** 0.0007 0.0014*** 0.0006 0.0012*** 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 
CONS 0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169   7169   7169   7169   7169   
R-squared 0.0106   0.0072   0.004   0.0061   0.0073   
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Table 4: The banking industry indices’ reaction to policy intervention announcements: general model 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 1. The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (estimated focusing on the Stock Banking 
Industry Index proxied by FTSE Bank Index) around policy announcements from between June 2007 and June 2012. In column (1), the dependent variable is the 
CAR calculated over the one-day (0;0) event window. In column 2, y is the CAR over the 5-day (-1; +3) event window. In column (3), y is the CAR over the 3-day (-
1;+1) event window. In column (4), y is the CAR calculated over the two-day (0; +1) event window. In column (5), y is the CAR calculated over the two-day (-1; 0) 
event window. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
MPE 0.0016*** 0.0005 0.0051*** 0.0016 0.0024** 0.0012 0.0023** 0.0009 0.0019* 0.001 
MPRU 0.0006 0.0006 0.0074*** 0.0019 0.0035** 0.0014 0.0022** 0.0011 0.0016 0.0011 
FSS 0.0007 0.0006 0.0081*** 0.0018 0.0057*** 0.0014 0.0037*** 0.0011 0.0026** 0.0011 
INA -0.0014 0.001 0.0073** 0.003 0.0001 0.0023 -0.0014 0.0017 0.0002 0.0018 
OTHER 0.0008 0.0005 0.0019 0.0017 0.0002 0.0013 0.0014 0.001 -0.0008 0.001 
SAFP 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0023 -0.0012 0.0017 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0014 
END 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0046 0.0047 -0.0001 0.0035 0.0022 0.0027 -0.0009 0.0028 
W -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0045** 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0016 -0.0025** 0.0013 0.0000 0.0013 
D2 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0004 0.002 -0.001 0.0015 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0012 
D3 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0014 0.0021 -0.0003 0.0016 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0011 0.0012 
CONS -0.0022* 0.0012 -0.0032 0.0039 -0.0042 0.0029 -0.0042* 0.0022 -0.001 0.0023 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the week fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169 
R-squared 0.0053 0.0058 0.0066 0.0079 0.0040 
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Table 5: The non-banking industry indices reaction to policy intervention announcements: general model 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 1. The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Return obtained for each country by the following 
FTSE local sectorial indices: FTSE INDUSTRIALS, FTSE TECHNOLOGY, FTSE TELECOM, FTSE UTILITIES, FTSE CON & MAT, FTSE CONSUMER GDS, 
FTSE CONSUMER SVS, FTSE BASIC MATS, and FTSE HEALTH CAR around policy announcements from between June 2007 and June 2012. In column (1), 
the dependent variable is the CAR calculated over the one-day (0;0) event window. In column (2), y is the CAR over the 5-day (-1; +3) event window. In column (3), 
y is the CAR over the 3-day (-1;+1) event window. In column (4), y is the CAR calculated over the two-day (0; +1) event window. In column (5), y is the CAR 
calculated over the two-day (-1; 0) event window. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. Results for each single non-banking industry are reported in the Appendix, which can be obtained upon request from the authors or downloaded 
from the authors’ website. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
MPE -0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0006** 0.0002 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0005** 0.0002 
MPRU -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0009** 0.0004 -0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0003* 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
FSS -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
INA 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0011** 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
OTHER -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0003* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
SAFP -0.0003 0.0003 0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 
END -0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0006 
W 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 
D2  0.001*** 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0002 
D3 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0005* 0.0003 
CONS -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 56084 56084 56084 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0010 0.0011 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 
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Table 6: Stock market reactions to monetary policy announcements: impact model on expansionary measures  
This table reports empirical results by running equation 2, where we replace the macro category “expansionary monetary” with its three components: IRC is a 
dummy variable that indicates interest rate cuts, LIQ is a dummy variable that indicates liquidity provision, ME is a dummy variable that indicates monetary easing 
intervention. IRC*D2, LIQ*D2, ME*D2, IRC*D3, LIQ*D3 and ME*D3 are interaction dummies accounting simultaneously for Policy action and sub-period effects. 
The dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the announcement day [i.e., the window (0,0)]. CARs are calculated focusing on the Stock 
Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index (proxied by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied by FTSE 
sectorial indices). We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: the results 
are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
 
 
Stock Market Bank Sector Non - Banking Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
IRC  -0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0059*** 0.0019 -0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0014* 0.0007 
LIQ 0.0007** 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004 0.002*** 0.0006 0.0013 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0006* 0.0003 
ME 0.0011** 0.0004 0.0024*** 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0006 0.0014 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 
MPRU -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0007** 0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0002 
FSS  -0.0015*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 
INA -0.0027*** 0.0005 -0.0027*** 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0010 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 
OTHER -0.0008** 0.0003 -0.0007** 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.001* 0.0006 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 
SAFP 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 
END 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 
W -0.0076* 0.0004 -0.0008** 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
D2 0.0015** 0.0003 0.0013** 0.0004 -0.002** 0.0006 -0.002** 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0003 
D3 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0001 0.0007 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
IRC*D2   
 
-0.0003 0.0013 
 
 
-0.0065*** 0.0024 
 
 
-0.0003 0.0009 
LIQ*D2   
 
-0.0052* 0.0029 
 
 
0.0214*** 0.0059 
 
 
-0.0097*** 0.0022 
ME*D2   
 
-0.0032*** 0.0009 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
-0.0014** 0.0007 
IRC*D3   
 
-0.0014 0.0016 
 
 
-0.0118*** 0.0032 
 
 
0.0006 0.0012 
LIQ*D3   
 
0.0067** 0.0029 
 
 
-0.0202*** 0.0058 
 
 
0.0106*** 0.0022 
ME*D3   
 
0.0000 0.0000 
  
-0.0001 0.0018 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
CONS 0.0012* 0.0006 0.0013* 0.0007 -0.0024* 0.0012 -0.0024* 0.0013 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.0007 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0108 0.0188 0.016 0.0195 0.023 0.0029 
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Table 7: Stock market reactions to monetary policy announcements: impact model on Restriction and unchanged measures 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 2, where we disentangle the macro category of “Restriction and unchanged measures” in its two components: 
CONTR is a dummy variable that indicates liquidity drain or end/reduction of monetary easing programs; IRIU is a dummy variable that indicates that interest rates 
increased or unchanged. IRIU*D2, CONT*D2, IRIU*D3, and CONT*D3 are interaction dummies accounting simultaneously for Policy action and sub-period 
effects. The dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the announcement day [i.e., the window (0,0)]. CARs are calculated focusing on the 
Stock Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index (proxied by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied by 
FTSE sectorial indices). We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: the 
results are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Stock Market Bank Sector Non - Banking Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
CONTR 0.0005 0.0006 0.0018** 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0011 0.0011 0.0014 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 
IRIU -0.0030 0.0003 -0.002*** 0.0006 0.002*** 0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 
MPE 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.0016*** 0.0005 0.0015*** 0.0005 -0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
FSS  -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002 
INA -0.0026*** 0.0005 -0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0012 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
OTHER -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0007** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 
SAFP 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003 
END 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0006 
W -0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0008** 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
D2 0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 -0.002** 0.0006 -0.0018** 0.0008 0.001*** 0.0002 0.0017*** 0.0003 
D3 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0013 0.0011** 0.0003 0.0008* 0.0003 
CONTR*D2   
 
-0.0032*** 0.0012 
  
0.0010 0.0014 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
IRIU*D2   
 
0.0024*** 0.0007 
  
0.0018 0.0014 
  
-0.0012** 0.0005 
CONTR*D3   
 
0.0000 0.0000 
  
-0.0330 0.0022 
  
-0.0007 0.0009 
IRIU*D3 
  
0.0021*** 0.0007 
  
0.0008 0.0013 
  
0.0005 0.0005 
CONS 0.0011* 0.0006 0.0017** 0.0007 -0.0022* 0.0012 -0.0021 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0050 0.0177 0.0109 0.0114 0.0010 0.0026 
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Table 8: Stock market reactions to fiscal policy announcements: impact model on State Aid & Fiscal Policy Impact Model 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 2. SAFP*D2 and SAFP*D3 are interaction dummies accounting simultaneously for Policy action and sub-
period effects. The dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the announcement day [i.e., the window (0)]. CARs are calculated focusing 
on the Stock Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index (proxied by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied 
by FTSE sectorial indices). We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: 
the results are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
Stock Market Bank Sector Non - Banking Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
SAFP 0.0004 0.0004 0.0022* 0.0014 0.0006 0.0007 0.0009 0.0026 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0026** 0.0010 
MPRU 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0005** 0.0002 
MPE 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0018*** 0.0005 0.0018*** 0.0005 -0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
FSS  -0.0014*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
INA -0.0026*** 0.0005 -0.0026*** 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0015 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
OTHER -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0007** 0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0007*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 
END 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0015 0.0015 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006 
W -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
D2 0.0015** 0.0003 0.0016** 0.0003 -0.002** 0.0006 -0.002** 0.0006 0.001*** 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0003 
D3 0.0009 0.0059 0.001* 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0011** 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0003 
SAFP*D2    -0.0019 0.0014   -0.0017 0.0027   -0.0027** 0.0010 
SAFP*D3   
 
-0.0022 0.0015 
  
0.0016 0.0028 
  
-0.0036*** 0.0011 
CONS 0.0010** 0.0005 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0021** 0.0009 -0.0024* 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0157 0.0160 0.0151 0.0158 0.0230 0.0012 
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Table 9: Stock market reactions to financial sector support policy announcements: Bank Failures and Bailouts Impact Model 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 2, where we replace the macro category INA with its two components: INAB is a dummy variable that 
indicates bank bailouts and assisted mergers; INAF is a dummy variable that indicates bank failures. INAB*D2, INAB*D3, INAF*D2, and INAF*D3 are interaction 
dummies accounting simultaneously for Policy action and sub-period effects. The dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the 
announcement day [i.e., the window (0,0)]. CARs are calculated focusing on the Stock Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index 
(proxied by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied by FTSE sectorial indices). We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event 
windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: the results are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
Stock Market Bank Sector Non - Banking Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
INAB -0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0015 0.0019 0.0019*** 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0024*** 0.0007 
INAF 0.0008 0.0015 -0.0045** 0.0021 0.0002 0.0041 -0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0036** 0.0015 
MPE 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0016** 0.0006 0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0006** 0.0002 
MPRU 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0018*** 0.0005 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0006*** 0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0002 
FSS  -0.0012*** 0.0003 -0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 0.0041 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0002 
OTHER -0.0006* 0.0003 -0.0006* 0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0008*** 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0002 
SAFP 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003 
END 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006 
W -0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0002* 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0003 
D2 0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0018*** 0.0003 -0.002** 0.0007 -0.0011 0.0007 0.001*** 0.0002 0.0009** 0.0003 
D3 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0011* 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0005** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 
INAB*D2 
  
-0.0035** 0.0012 
  
-0.0083*** 0.0023 
  
0.0047*** 0.0009 
INAF*D2 
  
0.0116*** 0.0029 
  
0.0080 0.0057 
  
0.0032 0.0021 
INAB*D3 
  
-0.0013 0.0017 
  
0.0000 0.0031 
  
0.0012 0.0012 
INAF*D3 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
  
  
CONS 0.0010 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0029** 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0044 0.0175 0.0108 0.0123 0.0023 0.0014 
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Table 10: Stock market reactions to Financial Sector Policies announcements: impact model  
 
This table reports empirical results by running equation 2, where we replace the macro category Financial Sector Policy with its three components: FL is a dummy 
variable that includes recovery measures for banks in the form of guarantees for old or new liabilities, enhancement of depositor protection schemes, and provision of 
lender of last resort facilities; FR is a dummy variable that includes capital injections and nationalization (acquisition of controlling share); FA includes recovery 
measures for banks in the form of asset purchase or ring-fencing of bad assets and asset guarantees. FL*D2, FL*D3, FR*D2, FR*D3, FA*D2, and FA*D3 are 
interaction dummies accounting simultaneously for Policy action and sub-period effects. The dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the 
announcement day [i.e., the window (0,0)]. CARs are calculated focusing on the Stock Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index 
(proxied by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied by FTSE sectorial indices). We run similar models by estimating CAR over the event 
windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: the results are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in 
Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
Stock Market Bank Sector Non - Banking Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
FA 0.0011*** 0.0005 0.0065*** 0.0017 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0072** 0.0034 0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0013 
FL -0.0004 0.0003 -0.002** 0.0010 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0018 0.0019 -0.0007*** 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0007 
FR -0.0014*** 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0021 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0030 0.0041 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0035** 0.0016 
MPE 0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0012*** 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0005 0.0015*** 0.0005 -0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
MPRU 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0014*** 0.0006 0.0016** 0.0006 -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
INA -0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0010 -0.0012 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 
OTHER -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0008*** 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0002 
SAFP 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0004 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 
END 0.0010 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 0.0014 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006 
W -0.0008** 0.0004 -0.0008** 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
D2 0.0012** 0.0003 0.0012** 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0013*** 0.0002 0.0007*** 0.0003 
D3 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0016** 0.0003 0.0007*** 0.0003 
FA*D2   
 
-0.0061*** 0.0018 
 
 
0.008** 0.0035 
 
 
0.0017 0.0013 
FL*D2   
 
0.002* 0.0011 
 
 
0.0007 0.0021 
 
 
-0.0001 0.0008 
FR*D2   
 
0.0022 0.0222 
 
 
0.0034 0.0041 
 
 
0.0034** 0.0016 
FA*D3   
 
-0.0049* 0.0027 
 
 
0.0074 0.0053 
 
 
0.0003 0.0020 
FL*D3   
 
0.0019 0.0012 
 
 
0.0037 0.0024 
 
 
-0.0023*** 0.0009 
FR*D3   
 
-0.0002 0.0024 
  
-0.0005 0.0047 
  
0.0025* 0.0018 
CONS 0.0009 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 -0.002* 0.0012 -0.0017 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 7169 7169 7169 7169 56084 56084 
R-squared 0.0150 0.0171 0.0106 0.0122 0.0011 0.0015 
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Table 11: Stock market reactions to Anticipated and Surprise effects 
 
This table reports empirical results where we focus on monetary policy actions based on interest rate decisions, and we 
disentangle the “expected” and “unexpected” effects following the approach proposed by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). The 
dependent variable is the Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated at the announcement day [i.e., the window(0,0)]. CARs 
are calculated focusing on the Stock Market General Index (i.e., proxied by FTSE broad Index), bank sector index (proxied 
by FTSE Bank Index), and non-Banking Sector indices (proxied by FTSE sectorial indices). We run similar models by 
estimating CAR over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (1-,1), and (-1,3) to check the consistency of our results: the results 
are available upon request from the authors. All variables are described in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
  General Index Model Bank sector Model Non- Banking Sector Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err 
 
Expected -0.0035*** 0.0012 0.0032 0.0032 -0.0013* 0.0007 
Unexpected -0.0041*** 0.0013 0.0034 0.0035 -0.0014* 0.0007 
Cons -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 
Year*Country Fixed Eff. YES YES YES 
Day of the week Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Number of observations 5024 5024 38512 
R-squared 0.0130 0.0004 0.0002 
 
 
